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Bold moves were effective in trade reform in Chile, Turkey, and
Venezuela. But discredited governments, .n countries with a
history of policy failure, are probably better off sending no
signals of policy reform and approaching it in small, cautious
steps.
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Reform is often flawed by delayed implementa-  In the literature on second-best reform
tion and, after initial acceptance, sudden rever-  strategies, misperceptions about the prospective
sals in public reaction. In recent years, many  costs and benefits of reform add another
attribute these delays and reversals to reform  intertemporal distortion to the maniy  already
dynamics because reform, panicularly when  identified.
comprehensive, rarely takes place all at once. In
designing reform, it is important to determine  Bold moves - such as preannounced
what the best sequence of reforrn would be,  institutional changes - are often suggested as a
under what conditions that sequence is feasible,  way to signal the beginning of a new policy
and how expectations will affect the success of  regime. Daveri advocates a more cautious
altemative reform strategies.  approach when a government has been discred-
ited by a history of policy failures.
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and Deborah Wetzel on a previous version of this paper.1.  INTRODUCTION
Reforms proposed for Less Developed Countries throughout the Eighties  (and for
East-European Countries in the last two years) have been principally aimed at
achieving an  economic restructuring, supposedly  conducive to  higher and sustained
growth, while maintaining  (or  helping restore) a framework of macroeconomic and
political stability.
Such  policy  measures  encompass  stabilization  policies  and  changes  in
institutional arrangements and rules in the direction of expanding the role and
scope  of the private sector and, in  parallel,  reducing the direct and  centralized
control of the public sector over resource allocation by altering the incentive
structure in both  domestic and  foreign markets/sectors  and strenghtening the
legal and regulatory framework where private initiatives take place.
Despite their overall advisability, reforms frequently encounter flaws such as
delayed implementatior.  and, when initially accepted, sudden reversals.
Delayed implementation of measures generating winners ard losers as a result of
their application  is neither new nor specific to Developing Countries. In the
first  half of  the Twenties as well as in  the wake of the Great Depression, France
was  a  highly  polarized  country  where  a  political  stalemate  came  about
consequently  to  sharp  disagreement  over  the  distribution  of  the  burden  of
contractionary policies'.
Moreover, ex-ante uncertainty on which group will be the winner and which the
I  With  reference to stabilization policies, Alesina and Drazen (1989)  make
two  further  poinLb.  FilzL,  VvulL;y  co Ltections  often coincide with a political
consolidation, that is when either political side takes the lead and forces the
weaker  political  group  sustain  a  disproportionate  fraction  of  the  total
adjustment costs. Second, successful programmes are usually preceded by several
failures and sometimes do not markedly differ from the unsucceseful ones: the
1926 French stabilization plan was very similar to the 1924 one and the same
holds for the 1923 German programme vs. the former ones.
1loser in the aftermath of the reform may add to distributional  conflicts  in
determining lags of implementation. Not only outward-oriented  reforms  favour
workers and entrepreneurs already  active in  exportable sectors, but also attract
some  of  them previously employed in  protected sectors,  whose firms  were producing
for the domestic markets before the opening up. Besides that. the new relative
price  structure  will  enable  completely  new exportable  sectors  to  grow  and
develop. Trade liberalization brought about drastic changes in the volume and
compasition of trade in South Korea (mid-1960s and early 1980s), Chile (second
half of Seventies) and Turkey (early 1980s). World Bank  (1989) also quotes the
relatively  unknown, but nonetheless  relevant, Colombia's experience with  exports
of  cut flowers, which rapidly grew from nothing, in the late Sixties, to more
than $200 million ten years later.
All  in  all,  it  seems  unreasonable  to  expect  such  dramatic  changes  whose
beneficiaries are unidentified in advance to be both perfectly anticipated and
supported by all individuals. The most vigorous opposition to reform proposals
sometimes arises from inside the Government bodies: e.g. Taiwanese Government
officials distrusted the outward-oriented reforms proposed by local economists 2,
while  a  proposal  to  reduce  protection  for an  automobile  assembly  firm was
successfully resisted by the Government agency holding shares in the firm and  by
the head of a trade regulatory agency tied to the firm 3.
Finally, implementation lags  may be attributed to the short time horizon of the
electorate or the Government, which causes short-term adjustment  costs to be
valued more than the forthcoming benefits of reforms.
Once  started, reforms  do  not always carry  through  the end.  The  Philippines
2  Fernandez and Rodrik (1990).
3  World Bank  (1990,  p.49).
2(1970), Turkey  (1958, 1970), Peru (1979) and Pakistan (1959, 1972) cases have
been  clasaified  as  failures  for  their  implementation  was  initiated,  yet
subsequently reversed.
In some cases, their short duration is partially due to external shocks, which
make overall well-designed reforms difficult to accomplish for some unexpected
events  happen. Fluctuations in  international  prices  of  exported goods, downswings
in aid inflows, climatical variations and civil wars are major setbacks whose
frequent  occurrence  severely  constrained  the  effectiveness  of  structural
adjustment in  many Sub-Saharan Countries.  Wheeler (1984)  attributes Kenya's good
performance in the  '70s  to favourable environmental conditions, while Gulhati
(1990)  reports that reform  efforts in  Zambia, Zaire  and  Madagascar were seriously
hampered by sharp terms of  trade deterioration, and in  Uganda by serious  domestic
political  instability  and  social  unrest.  Another  possible  explanation  for
reversals has  some bearing on one of  the  causes  for lags of  implementation
mentioned  above:  after  the  reform,  uncertainty  partially  vanishes  and  new
information becomes available as to the identity of those who will fare better.
Hence some of the losers, if not compensated, may find themselves uncomfortable
with the ultimate outcome of the policy change and withdraw their support to the
reforming Government, by joining those who have been actively lobbying against
the reform from the beginning 4.
The  mentioned  shortcomings  have  to  do  with  reforms  as  such,  without  much
consideration for the fact that their success or failure strongly depends on
'  The relevance of political economy considerations  (strength of exporter
groups,  leadership  commitment)  in  determining  a  backlash  in  trade  reforms
received some empirical validation in the tests carried out by Nabli  (1988).
3reform dynamics, that is characteristics such as:
- intensity  (how large is the change  in the value of the policy  instruments
required to enact thp  r-fm"'!
- speed  (how short is the time  horizon over which the reform  attempt  takes
place),
- comprehensiveness (how  many areas/sectore/markets are simultaneously involved,
that is how broad the field of reforms is),
- sequencing (the order in which reforms are undertaken),
whose overall  influence is related to the kind of reform(s)  at issue and to
country-specific initial conditions.
Take the commonly required fiscal correction for stabilization purposes, which
formed  part of nearly any  adjustment package after 1982.  For some  reasons (short-
run rigidity  of  fiscal systems, political  sensitivity of  current  Government
outlays), the burden of adjustment frequently insisted on public inv-stment by
the central Government, especially in social spending. Though budget cuts and
improved access to social services by the poor are, in theory, simultaneously
possible, toc large a decrease in health and education, or too short the period
o0-  -:-r  . -I.  t  ^_  _  rz,  'z  ... ,_ra  . X=;  sause dramatica±Ly  aaverse
consequences in  Developing  Countries than, say,  in  East-European Countries, where
the values  of Human Development  Indices  (such as  life expectancy  at birth,
…_'__'  '.ta'-e,  ''teac-Cy  .ate) a&re  cossly  similar to  -nose ot western  Countries.
This is to point out that  sharp discrepancies  in initial conditions  suggest
variable reform intensity.
The classical argument on  the  speed of implementation  of  economic liberalization,
made by Little,  Scitovsky, and Scott  (1970), is that reforms  should proceed
gradually (one at a time or according to a plan determined in advance), so as to
4minimize adjustment costs in  the  presence of  significant inflexibilities and hurt
the smallest possible number of people. Compensation for losers (e.g. firms and
workers of previLusly protected sectors, includirg the public sector) should be
provided through incomes policy and adjustment assistance. On the other hand, it
has been argued 5,  too slow a move towards reforming could discourage  resource
reallocation, leave  more room for  lobbying  against  reforms and, ultimately, drive
people to doubt on their persistence 6.
As to comprehensiveness, "packaging"  reforms allows to  exploit complementarities
so as  to maxe the follow through more automatic: for  tariff reduction to produce
its highest attainable gains accompanying measures in exchange rate, regulatory
and public sector policies are clearly required.  According to Hirschman (1963),
undertaking  global reforms is  also  advisable in  order to allow  the implementation
of  a reform, desirable by itself yet neglected in the face of more popular and
visible ones. So essentially did Celso Furtado when the sugar cane problem was
dealt with  in the  SUDENE plan  for the Brazilian North East.  Moreover,  in a
comprehensive  programme,  losers  from  specific  measures  can  receive  some
compensation elsewhere.
In  these cases, the more comprehensive a package of reforms, the more likely its
success.
However, it should not be forgotten that comprehensive plans may be excessively
demanding in terms  of management and administration capacities,  thus raising
coordination  problems. The  implementation  of  actual economic  reforms requires the
collaboration  of  many  individuals  and  agencies  with  distinct  personal  and
organizational interests. For instance,  though in the presence of full agreement
5  For instance, Neary (1982).
6  On this point, see more in section 3.
5on general policy  goals, the limited significance :f such general  statements
interplayed with the shortage of administration skills, in generating internal
inconsistency and short-run orientation of structural reforms in many African
Countries 7.
However desirable and  particularly when comprehensive, reforms rarely take place
all at once. Determining whe'ther  an optimal sequencing exists and under what
conditions  it  is  feasible  is  an important element  in the  design  of  policy
reforms, given that  not all sequences end up producing  ultimately  identical
results.
Yut recommending  a specific  sequencing  has proved  a difficult  task,  nainly
because  the optimal  path  of  sequencing  depends  on  the  kind  of  distortions
Initially affecting the economy and on how Governments evaluate each of them.
When simultaneous distortions affect the adjustment process, eliminating one of
them does not guarantee t'e economy to approach the first-best. What is worse,
no general presumption can be inferred on the direction of the misperception,
that is if private expectations overshoot or undershoot the "true" social costs
and benefits;  hence,  very  little guidance  is provided to  ascertain  whether
ruiorms  are  inappropriately  sequenced  and either too  rapidly  or  too  slowly
implementedO.
In practice, reforming Governments  in Developing Countries  and  international
organizations  proved more  eager to address budgetary  and trade  distortions,
taking  the  rigidities  in  labour  markets  and  the  apparent  biases  in  the
composition  of Government expenditure as  given.  This  most likely  occurred because
I  See Gulhati  (1990),  chs.2,3.
9 The  bulk of the economic knowledge on sequencing is  effectively summarized
in Dixit (1986).
6labour  markets  and  Government  expenditure  are  considered  politically  contentious
areas 9 rather  than as a consequence  of  welfare  maximization  criteria.
In the absence  of general guidelines,  the economists'  perspective  on reform
implementation  has taken quite a narrow  view and the discussion,  especially
stimulated by  the  Southern  Cone  policy  experiments,  dealt  with few issues  such
as the  precedence of stabilization  over liberalization  and the  order of
liberalization (current versus capital account, domestic versus  external
financial  liberalization).
Some  statements  on  the  principal  steps  to  undertake  have  been formulated  and  are
sometimes  considered  'common  knowledge".  They can  be summarized  as follows.
First,  stabilization  is  a  precondition  to  any  form  of  liberalization,  because  not
only  macroeconomic  instability  lessens  the  efficacy  of liberalization  ,  but  also
trade and  financial  liberalization  have adverse  macroeconomic  implications.
Second,  domestic  capital  market  liberalization  is a precondition  to external
capital  market  liberalization,  because  otherwise  foreign  capital  would  flow  out,
thus destabilizing  an economy  with  poorly  working  financial  markets.
Third, external  goods market liberalization  should  precede external capital
market liberalization,  because  otherwise  major foreign  capital inflows  would
cause  the  real  exchange  rate  to  appreciate,  at  variance  with  the  requirementa  for
a successful  trade  liberalization.
Nevertheless,  a  broader  consideration  of  the implications  of stabilization  and
liberalization  packages  raises  some  question  marks  even  on  the few  consolidated
points  reached  so far.  Special  emphasis  in  the  paper  is devoted  to analyze  the
role  of people's  misperception  regarding  the  reforms.
9 Labour  markets  are  not  even  mentioned  among  the  possible  areas  of reform
in  the  otherwise  comprehensive  survey  of  the  main  current  issues  in  Latin  America
provided  by Williamson  (1990,  ch.3).
7Misperceptions add to objective Costs by lessening people's willingneas to carry
out the necessary behavioural adjustment or making their efforts less effective
and, in some cases, harmful to the  final  rvnl  rof  +-hrt  '-Pf9m1
The question that arises is whether there exists  scope for the Government  to
increase the net gains from reforms by avoiding expectational mistakes. Properly
announcing  the  future  course  of  the  reform  or  signalling  policy-makers'
determination  to  go  through  with  it,  regardless  of  contingencies,  might
significantly decrease the uncertainty faced by individuals and open the way to
the new regime. Institutional reforms& 0 aimed at enabling the Government to carry
out  binding  precommitments  on  its  future  course  of  conduct,  as  well  as
establishing reputation, say by overshooting the target, have been proposed as
remedies to credibility  problems. let often overlooked are the costs entailed by
such "investments" in reputation: in the final part  of the paper, a careful
assessment of  their  benefits and costs is  recommended as a  necessary precondition
before credibility-enhancing measures can be successfully implemented.
An organizing framework to discuss costs and benefits of policy reforms is set
up  in section  2.1, while  section 2.2 surveys  some of the  issues  concerning
stabilization and liberalization (section  2.2.11 and t.he oL:dwL  u  liberalization
(section 2.2.2). Section 3 summarizes how expectational issues affect costs and
benefits of reforms (section  3.1), with special reference to lack of credibility
- ,…"-.eione  o  II~LUn  ex.ectat.c.LW  a..d e,L.uu  dy,cuuL&  liow  in section
4.
10 Such as the divorce between Central Bank and Treasury as well as the
voluntary participation in binding international agreements.
82.  ON THE CONSISTENCY OF REFORMS
2.1  Costs  and  benefits  of reforms
Reforms are geared to generate the economy's approptiate response in terms of
resource  reallocation,  which  was  impossible  under  the  former  regime.  Such
reallocation brings about the creation of new fiLme and industries attracting
workers and  entrepreneurs from  previously  protected sectors (including  the  public
and parastatal  ones),  together  with  a  flat  reduction  in  wasteful  directly
unproductive, rent--seking activities, which usually develop in parallel with
controls and regulations. The bulk of the measurable  gains from reforms thus
consists of higher efficiency. The extent of benefits from the reforms are also
influenced (sometimes significantly hampered) by administrative efficiency in
reform design and execution.
Yet moving resources from one allocation to another also involve transitional
costs,  deriving  from  all  sorts  of  preexisting  market  imperfections  and
externalities, which injure  the success  of  an overall  well conceived and socially
advisable  rAform&'.  Domestic market  disruption  and temporary  unemployment  of
people laid off in the previously protected sectors; labour retraining and loss
of installed and non-shiftable  capital, together with  macroeconomic external and
domestic imbalances, are examples of such temporary costs. They are the price
paid for a  change of regime and are  often considered unavoidable, at least in  the
short run.
11  Stern (1989, p.616) provides an accurate list of reasons for both market
and Government-induced  failures,  based  on  the  scrutiny  of  the  assumptions
underlying the two fundamental theorems of welfare. It is striking how little
consideration causes  of distortions  and  externalities are  given in  the literature
onn  seqienminga speed and timina of reforms.
9As Fischer  (1986) effectively pointed out, the costs of  reforms  are usually
immediate  and  highly visible, while  their most  relevant  gains  are delayed,
dynamic and hard to measure. In a world ridden with imperfections,  it comes as
no surprise that reforms encounter some flaws. Some of them can be represented
through the organizing framework that follows.
Consider an economy living infinitely after carrying out a refo-  at time 0, and
going through two different phases, the transition and the new regime.
A reform is undertaken when its social let  benefits are strictly positive (that
is  whenever the total  benefits accruing  to the economy over time more than  offset
total costs). Call "transition" the period during which costs per unit of time
are greater than benefits per unit of time, while the "new regime" comes about
as a result of the reform, when benefits per unit of time are greater than costs
per unit of time. The transition ends when gross benefits and costs  per unit of
time net out.
Now define more precisely how costs and benefits evolve over time.
Costs  stem  from existing  distortions,  such as  monopoly  or monopsony  power,
limited  factor  mobility,  price  rigidities' 2,  which  result  in  unemployment,
balance of payments and Government budget deficits at the aggregate level, and,
sectorally, in temporary unemployment, foregone  training costs,  bankruptcies for
firms and banks (especially in import-competing industries).
Assume that coste per unit of time, C,  are smoothly decreasing over time, say
at an exponential rate a, and starting from an initial level of co,  which seems
to be in accordance with their hypothesized transitional nature:
12  All of them can be endogenously determined within the private sector (as
a result of staggering of contracts or collusion between firms and trade unions
within protected sectors so as to prevent entry of new comers) or superimposed
by the Government on the private sector through regulation and controls.
10(1)  q  - co-exp{-atj  O<a<l ; c0>0  ; O<t<3
The  curve  of  benefits  per unit  of time,  B,, is, on  the  contrary,  steadily
increasing over time at a constant rate B, starting from an initial level bo.
Benefits mainly consist of static  and dynamic  welfare gains from improvements in
resource  allocation,  whose  specific  form  depends  on  the  kind  of  reforms
undertaken. There are also additional benefits such as eligibility for foreign
assistance or greater flexibility in the face of external shocks which, though
undoubtly relevant, are harder to  measure and are subsumed in the constant term:
(2)  B,  = boexp{13t}  0<<1  ;  co>bo>0  ; O<t<c
The fact that cO>bO  embodies the presumption that the economy has to undergo some
"sacrifice" in  order to move to  the new regime; this implicitly  raises the issues
of whether  people  will  accept  to  sustain  this  trade-off  and  how  much  the
Government  should commit to future benefits through  "promises", which will be
both taken up in section 3.
Equating (1) and (2) (benefits and costs per unit of time) allows to determine
the end of the transition phase t':
'n;  co  /bo)
(4)  t2
B+a
which is positively related to the initial level c.  costs and negatively related
to the initial level of benefits and  to the rate of change of costs and benefits
over time.
A question to raise at this stage is why a far-sighted reforming  Government
11should  care  about  the  length  of  the  transition:  if  a  reform  is  socially
beneficial, the length of the transition should not be influential on welfare
grounds,  because rnly  the present  value  of net  discounted benefits should matter.
However, the social discount rate may be too high and substantially lessen the
scope for intertemporal substitution, due to politieal  instability or fear of
external  shocks.  If  the  Government  faces  strong  and  competitive  political
opposition,  its time  horizon may not be long enough to await until  the  net
benefits of reforms turn out positive.
The possible occurrence of  external shocks might also suggest the society as a
whole to prefer a shorter transition period rather than an uniform distribution
of the burden over time.
Figure 1 highlights how the end of the transition is determined as well as the
trade-off between gradualism and "cold turkey".
A shock reform cost-equivalent to a  gradual reform  is drawn for higher values of
the parameters co  (c*)  and  a (a.),  which leads  to a shorter but tougher transition
period  (t,t').  An intense and rapidly accomplished reform  indeed  increases
temporary costs at the outset,  but  may still  be advantageous, if there are strong
motives  for  the  Government  to  fear  the  future  or  if  policy-makers  enjoy
reasonably high support at the beginning. Moreover, the more generous external
assistance to adjustment, the less  costly to compensate losers for the country;
thus the more likely for benefits from a "cold  turkey" strategy to outweigh its
costs.
Vice versa, the net effect of increasing  plan comprehensiveness on the length of
the transition appears a priori indeterminate because two conflicting elements
may  move the benefit curve upwards  and downwards:  a better exploitation of reform
complementarities raises its benefits, while congestion effects may contribute
12to reduce them.
2.2  The  debate  an  reform  dynamics
2.2.1  Stabilization and liberalization
The  advisability of reforms is  not  only influenced  by their prospective costs and
benefits, but also by the costs of maintaining the current policy regime.
High and unstable inflation and persistent balance of payments deficits as well
as microeconomic distortions are undoubtly costly. However, they often coexist
in  many developing and socialist countries.
Iigh inflation by  itself  is often  said not to  be too  damaging' 3,  while the
welfare costs of price instabilit-'  are to a greater extent emphasized. First, in
an inflationary environment, the Lse of money as a unit of account is undercut,
for  contracts  become  riskier".  Second,  the  increased  uncertainty  due  to
instability reduces the informational content of relative prices, potentially
worsening centralized as well as decentralized resource allocation. Productive
factors  are  devoted to exploiting  opportunities for  arbitrage,  while the planning
horizon of  firms  shrinks; a defensive and waiting  attitude  develops  in the
13 As long as it is fully anticipated and institutions are inflation-proof.
See Fischer and Modigliani (1978) on this point.
"  The phenomenon called "dollarization" can be taken as an extreme case of
the progressive loss of confidence in local currency as the relevant unit of
account.
13private sector as a whole and capital flight may take place either officially
(when  capital  movements are  allowed) or unofficially (through  over-invoicing and
under-invoicJncv  of  trmlp  +-  oŽr  c  tri;h.t  smuggl  Iig).  In  turn,
persistently negative external balances cause, in the absence of exchange rate
corrections, excessive foreign indebtness and/or drawing down of hard currency
reserves, which  is often exacerbated by the speculative attacks described  in
Krugman (1979).
Microeconomic distortions due  to  both "market  failures"  and "Government failures"
involve static and dynamic resource misallocation, which decreases the overall
efficiency of the economy. Take trade restrictions as an example" 5:  protection
results  in distorting  the pattern of  production and the  use  of  inputs  into
production and in distorting the pattern of consumption, because price signal3
do not reflect the actual trading opportunities open to the country. Moreover,
these costs are probably outweighed by the additional costs of protection due to
administration and compliance tasks and individuals' rent-seeking behaviour' 6.
Hence, costs  from  macroeconomic instability  as  well  as  microeoconomic distortions
seem  to be  very  high;  both  fiscal,  monetary  and  exchange  rate  measures,  on  the
Anf  ,o"A…  .-  an',.a.  iiujralization,  on tne other,
would be very often necessary to restore the potential for growth as well as to
enhance welfare and equity. Yet, economists' 7 addressing this  question in the
':st t_n  y_a_-  yrae  that .. e.aicALzaL1vn  and stao±i.zation packages should not
5  The argument follows Corden (1987).
16 Administration and compliance costs are often very high in the presence
of a licensing system, which is also likely to generate rent-seeking costs as a
result of wasteful competition in order to obtain the licenses.
17 Among others, McKinnon  (1973, 1982), Edwards  (1985), Corbo and de Melo
(1987),  Dornbusch  (1983).
14be undertaken  together.  Their  main  argument  refers  to  the  conceivable  difficulty
of  establishing an  efficient relative price  structure in  a  perturbed
macroeconomic environment.  In  what  follows,  additional  macroeconomic
inconveniences,  possibly  brought  about  by  trade  and  financial  liberalization,  are
summarized.
Macroeconomic  implications  of trade  liberalization
As to  external  liberalization,  wrong  sequencing  (e.g.  an  abrupt  move from  quotas
to free  trade)  as  well as  excessive  speed  may contribute  to the adverse  effects
on the external  balance  of liberalizations  intended  to  be welfare-improving' 8,
thereby  triggering  off stabilization  problems,  especially  in economies  with  no
access  to international  capital  markets.
Moreover,  historical  episodes,  such  as  the  much discussed  ones in the Southern
Cone, have shown that even liberalization  programmes  which appeared to be
compatible  with balance  of payments  equilibrium  from  an ex-ante  point  of view
turned  out  to  be harmful  if implemented  simultaneously  with  exchange-rate  based
stabilization  policies' 9. The use of the exchange  rate as a nominal anchor
narrows  the feasible  path for obtaining  the real devaluation  necessary  when
liberalizing  trade  so  as  to  materially  support  the  desired  expenditure  switching,
18 Temporary  budget  and  balance  of  payments  deficits,  though  costly  in  the
short-run,  may  well  stem from  optimal  intertemporal  resource  allocation  as long
as they are sustainable,  that is if they respect the intertemporal  budget
constraints  and the  so called  "no-Ponzi-game"  condition.
'9  Kiguel  and  Liviatan  (1988,  1990)  distinguish  between  exchange  rate-based
and other types of stabilization  policies  and investigate  their empirical
features.
15while maintaining the balance of payments in equilibriums'.
To put it another way, a liberalization that is compatible with the maintenance
of  external  equilibrium  may  not  be  compatible  with  an  exchanye-rate  based
stabilization, for too many tasks are simultaneously assigned to the exchange
rate.
Alternative ways of staging  trade liberalization  are also likely  to have effects
in terms of tax revenues, whose positive or negative sign depends on the price
elasticity  of  imports  and  exports  and  the  intensity  and  length  of  the
liberalization  process. While a  switch from  quotas to  equivalent tariffs is  often
supposed relatively soft on the fiscal side, moving from a tariff-based regime
towards free trade would probably involve the need to find alternative sources
of revenues
2 1.
Among others, seigniorage has often been used, especially in Latin America, in
the aftermath of the debt crisis, which  implied sharp increases in inflation
rates and,  whenever the exogenous seigniorage  needs were not compatible with any
steady state inflation, the emergence of hyperinflationary episodes  (Bolivia
1985, Peru 1989-90).  The  alternative route of  promoting fiscal  reforms to  enlarge
the tax base while reducing tax rates has rarely been attempted.
Macroeconomic implications of financial liberalization
As  a first  approximation, financial liberalization appears to be  harmful to
stabilization purposes if undertaken early, no matter whether it is domestic or
X  When the nominal exchange rate is fixed, a real devaluation can obtain
only as a result of a domestic deflation.
21  See Edwards  (1989) for an elegant formalization of the problem, using
duality theory.
16external.
On the one hand, liberalizing domestic financial markets, before stabilization
Lakes  place,  nuuntua  to  rwduLisLn  Guverument  revenues  C,wu  aeigniorage  for any
level  of the budget deficit (through  the reduced  real demand for  money consequent
to  the  increased  availability of  positive  interest-bearing  instruments  for
saving), thereafter potentially fuelling the rate of inflation2. Moreover, the
underlying macroeconomic instability is likely to originate high domestic real
interest rates, which would increase  the burden of  Government debt repayment and
the likelihood of default.
On the other hand, opening up the capital account when stabilization reforms are
still under way  would permit capital flight and further worsen  the external
accounts, quite at the wrong moment, that is  when additional resources would be
especially needed to finance compensatory measures in a non-inflationary way.
Further aualifications
The seemingly unfavourable macroeconomic consequences of trade  and financial
liberalization seem to confirm the case for stabilizing first, in order not to
worsen domestic and external accounts.
Yet:
- Though liberalizing first appears not to be advisable, it ought to be borne in
mind that stabilizing a  distorted  economy is  presumably  costlier than stabilizing
an undistorted, perfectly competitive economy.  Members of organized coalitions,
such as farmers, landlords, or unionized workers, may collude with the goal of
appropriating a higher share  of national income  during the disinflation, thereby
2  McKinnon  and Mathieson  (1981), Dornbusch and Reynoso  (1989). For  an
application to Argentine in the late Seventies, see Sjastad (1983).
17increasing price  stickiness and slowing down the  speed of  disinflation when
agents' expectations are pessimistic'.
The way in which stabilizations are carried out is not at all neutral on the
possibility of  successfully  carrying  out liberalization  afterwards. For instance,
as tariffs are employed to rapidly and effectively raise Government revenues in
countries heavily  relying on trade taxes>,  it may be  the  case that today's
stabilization (without permanent fiscal correction) undermines the success of
trade liberalization in the future.
- Stabilization  policies based  on temporary  price, wage and exchange rate freezes
appear  to  significantly  reverse  the  timing  between  costs  and  benefits  of
reforms>. Benefits accrue  quickly and at low costs, while costs in terms of real
exchange rate overvaluation and balance of payments emerge more slowly. After an
initial  honeymoon  period,  when  benefits  net  of  costs  are  positive  (rapid
disinflation and no output contraction), the wedge between the sharply rising
costs  of  real  exchange  rate  appreciation  and  freeze-induced  rigidities  in
resource allocation and the thin benefits of temporary disinflation widens, so
that, at some point  in time, the reform  is abandoned: this  was the case  in
Argentina, Peru and Brazil in 1985-86. Two countervailing elements w,re at work
in  the Israeli successful story:  the  substantial inflows of US foreign  assistance
and the switch to a nonaccomodating attitude of the Central Bank.
2  A nice formalization of such policy dilemma can be found in Blanchard and
Fischer  (1989,  p.611-612).
I  Collier and Joshi  (1989) point out that the use of trade policy as a
support  to the macro management Is  commonplace, especially in  African countries.
Raising tariffs to obtain a rapid budget deficit reduction has also played a
major role in recent stabilization plans in Argentina and Peru.
2  Kiguel and Liviatan (1991)  evaluate pros and cons of so called heterodox
stabilization policies.
18- When stabilizations appear to be systematically delayed>6,  structural reforms
would run the risk of waiting forever. In such a case, the claim "stabilization
first"  seems to  conflict with  common  sense, which  would  suggest  that  some
liberalization steps could be cautiously initiated.
However, the  "common sense" solution raises an additional problem:  the most
effective steps  on the  way to perfect competition do not  necessarily ease the way
to stabilization. Dismantling the oligopolistic structure of labour and goods
markets would surely be aimed at reducing price and wage stickiness, but would
also  presumably contribute to deteriorate the social climate, thereby laying the
foundations for either a rekindling of inflation or a loss of consensus for the
manoeuvre.
2.2.2  The  order  of  liberalization
While the precedence of stabilization over liberalization reforms as a whole
appears to be reasonably robust (though with the caveats expressed  in section
2.2.1), nothing comparable can  be set  out concerning the order of liberalization
between domestic and external goocs and capital markets.
Th.  view  that  domestic  liberalization  (in  the  form  of  privatization  and
decentralization) should  come before external liberalization, so  as to dismantle
local monopolistic positions  before opening up  trade maintains  that  foreign
2M  Alesina and Drazen (1989)  provide a conflict-based view of stabilizations
as war of attrition games, where the "stabilizer" group, giving up the fight,
bears a disprortionate share of the burden of adju3tment.
19competition  should  wait  outside  until  a "proper"  domestic  environment  has  been
set  up.
However, this fails to address an important question: the development  of
competition  and  markets  has dynamic  effects  in the  provision  of incentives  for
learning,  discovery  and  innovation.  If  Governments  are  not  strong  enough  to  bear
the  unpopularity brought about  by  the  transitional costs  of  external
liberalization,  it is  not  easy  to figure  out  how  they  could  succeed  in  breaking
off local  monopolies.  Perhaps,  foreign  competition  could  provide  a less  direct
way of reducing  the degree  of monopoly  in the economy"  and take advantage  of
incentive  provision.
Another  rationale  for  delaying  the  opening  up  of  the  economy,  provided  by Rodrik
(1989b),  is the "evd for maintaining  a certain and predictable  structure  of
incentives  for the private  sector  as a feasible  goal for policy  reforms (as
opposed  to liberalization  at all coats).  It can be refuted  that pointing  to
predictability  of the after-reform  regime  as a major goal  may implicitly  lend
support  to the  maintenance  of  the  status  quo;  moreover,  as  Edwards (1989,  p.24)
remarks,  maintaining  a  predictable  structure  of incentives  may  be  too  costly  when
'nitial  Uen  aje  vezy  hiiyh *n.i  interrwlnea.
Although  drawing  answers  on  broad  issues  such  as  privatization,  deregulation,  and
management-property  relationship  remains  difficult,  recent  advances  in  the  theory
. ucdulai.i  oryanization  would  prooably  provide  some  clue  to a  more thorough
understanding of the consequences of  rigidities and market failures  and of the
role played  by the ownership  structure  and the type of goods produced  than
27 Improving  the  overall  competitiveness  of the  system  does  not necessarily
amount  to establishing  a  perfect  competition  world,  with  many  small  price-taking
firms.  A higher  market  contestability  (i.e.  decreasing  sunk  costs  to entry  and
exit) would be enough to deliver competitive-like  results (price  equal to
marginal  cost)  regardless  of the  number  of  incumbent  firms.
20standard welfare  models, based on the  perfect  competition-full  information-
complete markets paradigm, do. In the absence of such an imperfect competition
approacn&,  any  commitment  tu  more  Pe[;i  beJuW1sLe.1Y  VdL!1b  4A1  t..  LiA  UIll=  dJQve
mentioned  ie likely  to  be  founded  on  preconceptions.
Leaving  these  general  remarks  aside,  I  come  to  the  two  aspects  of  liberalization
sequencing which  have received explicit attention  in the literature: whether
domestic financial markets ought to be liberalized before external capital is
permitted to flow in and out and whether trade liberalization should precede
external capital market liberalization.
Domestic  financial  liberalization  as  a  precondition  for  external  financial
liberalization
one of the few propositions enjoying generalized consensus is that the capital
account should be opened last, because early capital flows can be harmful in  two
ways, depending on whether they flow out or in after  the opening up.
In  the first place, capital flight  takes place when, as mentioned above, opening
the capital account precedes stabilization reforms as well as domestic financial
reforms.  Moreover,  apart  from  stabilization  reasons,  domestic  financial
liberalization should come before external opening up in order to prevent too
sharp a disruption of existing local financial institutions.
The case for low controlled  interest  rates (resulting  in "repression" of  domestic
2  Matsuyama  (1990) provides a formal discussion  of the advisability  of
temporary protection as a credible threat to persuade local firms to invest and
become competitive along the way to complete liberalization.
2  In  the  1970s,  Argentina  and  Uruguay  started  with  capital  market
liberalization, while  Chile  did the  opposite  in the  same  period.  Indonesia
simultaneously opened both current and capital accounts.
21financial  markets)  has  often  been  advocated  from  Keynesian  standpoints  either  in
order  to offset  people's  preference  for  liquidity  or to permit  Governments  to
finance  their  budget  deficits  at  low  costs.  Moreover,  old  and  nec-etvucturalists
mainly  emphasized  the stagflationary  effects  of tight  monetary  policy  and  high
interest  rates.
Leaving auide  theoretical justifications,  loan  rate  ceilings have  been
extensively  used  in  many  LDCs  in  conjuction  with  import  restrictions  to  encourage
industrialization  through  import-substitution.  McKinnon  (1973)  and Shaw (1973)
challenged  this  orientation,  pointing  out  that  interest  rate  ceilings  associated
with  administrative  allocation  of  credit  were  likely  to have adverse  effects  on
sa7ings  and  growth.  The  main  drawbacks  attributed  to financial  repression  were
that  it  discourages  risk-taking,  prevents  lending  institutions  from  charging  risk
premia,  promotes  low-yielding  direct  investment  as a substitute  for  depositing
money  in a bank and  encourages  the  adoption  of capital-intensive  techniques.
Those  advocating  domestic  liberalization  rely  on McKinnon-Shaw-type  arguments:
they  expect  interest  rates  in the  official  credit  market  to be pushed  up so as
to make domestic  capital  markets  more appealing  to household savings  and to
eauate  thB price  of capital  with its  true  marginal  cost.
However,  concentrating  on the  level  of interest  rates  as the  ultimate  objective
of domestic financial  markets liberalization3  can be partially misleading.
UndArtnkInn  a  complete  financial reformu  requires, am.ong  other  things,
establishing reliable  deposit-taking institutions, reducing  loan  market
segmentation  (which  produces  market  outcomes  unsatisficing  on  efficiency  as  well
as  on equity  grounds),  allowing  for  a  more indirect  Government  intervention  in
3  This is more often  done by those  who oppose  it. The World  Development
Report  1989  contains  a  well developed  survey  of the  requirements  for financial
development.
22credit allocation and, at the same time, strengthening the necessary  role of
supervision and regulation played by the monetary authority.
If too  s.Luw  a seL wZ  sdsujwb  .L&.  puL  it  pJ.i-w, uc.s  -L1  ia  sy  .oi&ie
about.
Apart from the mentioned effects on the real demand for money  (which increasee
the inflationary Impact of any  given 4 budget deficit), interest rates may well not
go  up  aa a  result  of  financial liberalization. Financial  repression,  often
Government-induced, can also endogenously arise consequently to the functioning
of a unregulated competitive credit  market whenever collecting information about
the  risk  characteristics  of  different  borrowers  is  costly.  If  asymmetric
information between borrowers and lenders cannot be overcome through additional
contractual  instruments  (such as the provision of  suitable  collateral), the
equilibrium interest rate may not increase and liberalization would thus prove
insufficient to persuade domestic capital not to fly away 3,.
Alternatively3 2, especially whenever macroeconomic instability is still around,
freeing interest  rates may result in  deposit-taking institutions paying intereat
rates on deposits lower  than the lowest  rate before interest deregulation, while
cnarg2ng a nigner iending  rate  Lhiaii  bc.ure.
For  sure,  domestic financial liberalization  is  an important  factor in  encouraging
a  balanced development in  a  mdrket economy,  because, in allowing a  more efficient
coilection  ano  allocation  of  savings,  it  mitigates  tne  effecrs  of  snarp
fluctuations in current income on current consumption, thereby  smoothing the
consumption path over time.  Yet, it is only a necessary, but not  sufficient
31  Dornbusch  and  Reynoso  (1989) argue  that,  in  any  case,  very  little
empirical evidence exists on the alleged link  between interest rates and growth.
32  An example of this phenomenon has been Ghana in the 1980s.
23condition for enabling the opening up of the capital account.
Current versus capital account liberalization
Even once  macroeconomic adjustment (fiscal  and  monetary correction) and domestic
financial  liberalization have  been carried  out in  advance, a simultaneous opening
up of current  and capital  accounts is considered  to be  harmful  to  economic
welfare.
Based on the second-best proposition that, in a multiple distortion world, the
removal of  one distortion  could have negative  rather than  positive  welfare
implications, as long as the others stand still, Edwards  and van  Wijnbergen
(1986) show two main results:
- negative welfare effects stem from capital market liberalization under trade
restrictions;
- gradual trade liberalization ameliorates  welfare and is superior to an abrupt
one under capital market imperfections.
The costs of liberalizing capital first in an economy where the goods market is
distorted are  due to the fact that, the importable  good being capital-intensive,
an increase in capital endowments would result (by  the Rybczynski theorem) in a
higher production of importables, which would worsen welfare 33.
On the contrary, a  gradual trade liberalization strategy enhances welfare in  the
presence of a capital market distortion, because it modifies  the consumption
discount factor, thereafter increasing saving  and investment with respect to the
33 Edwards  and  van  Wijnbergen  consider  the  case  where  the  additional
borrowing is  employed to increase investment.  If  all of  the new foreign  borrowingi
were used for current consumption, there  would be no welfare deterioration even
in the presence of tariffs. This partially weakens the argument.
24rationed initial position9.
Edwards and Edwards  (1987,  p.182-183) also emphasize that early opening of the
capital  account  unnecesearily raises  adjustment  costs  when  resour.e  movements are
costly. The  argument  is as  follows: given that the  speed  of  adjustment  in
financial  markets is higher  than in  goAIs  markets, an immediate inflow of foreign
capital is first observed, while nothing happens in  the goods tnarket.  This will
result in increased  money supply, inflation  and real exchange rate appreciation,
unless the Central Bank sterilizes the inflow. Alternatively, under a floating
exchange rate, nominal and real appreciation  ot the  exchange rate  will take  place
in order to maintain the external balance. In both cases, resources will move
into  the nontradable sector.  However, after  enough  time  has elapsed, the response
of the goods markets to the trade liberalization  will show up, triggering off a
movement of resources in the opposite direction, that is out of the nontradable
sector. If resource mobility is not costless, the double movement of resources
causes unnecessary costs,  which clearly conflicts  with the pursuit of successful
trade reforms.
3  Once again, the result  of superiority  of gradualism hinges upon investment
bearing  a disproportionate  part  of the borrowing  constraint:  were  there  no
distortions in the capital market the static  welfare loss due to tariffs could
prevail and invalidate the result.
"  Going a step further, some authors, such as Leamer (1980),  Neary (1982),
Edwards (1988,  pp.177-182) and Mussa (1986),  have developed models with sector-
specific  capital  and  labour  market  distortions  il. uLdi  iU  ivtaluaLi  &t
implications of intersectoral transfer costs, wage rigidity and minimum wage
legislation in terms of optimal staging of tariff reductions. In these models,
the first-best policy  still consists of a complete elimination  of the tariff
(unless income distribution  issues with no lump sum transfers  are taken into
account). However, the presence of adjustment costs  (in the form of frictional
unemployment) suggests, as a second-best solution, a more gradual approach to
tariff  reduction.  The argument  runs as  follows: in a two-period  two-sector
economy, workers are informed  at  the beginning  that  protection will last for  some
time in the future before being eliminated. This makes being employed  in the
protected  industry rational in the first period, while transferring  into the
exportable sector may not be rational in the next period, as long as there are
25In  general, it remains unclear how the conclusion in favour of gradualism drain
by Edwards and  van  Wijnbergen can be  generalized to  encompass the  many additional
distortions characterizing the real world.
Further gualifications
- Either  destabilizing or anti-trade  effects of foreign capital do  not take place
"naturally". Under fixed or managed exchange rate regimes, the damage brought
about by capital outflows and inflows can be sensibly reduced, provided that an
efficient domestic market for public bonds is  created as a part of the financial
reform  and  the  monetary authority  sterilizes the  external inflow  of money through
open market  operations.  This  appears  to  strengthen  t-he  case  for  domestic
financial  reform as a  precondition to external financial opening up. Once public
bonds  can  be  issued  and  a  market  for  them  develops,  since  then  policy
mismanagement  partially  shares  the  blame  for  the  anti-trade  liberalization
effects commonly attributed to early capital inflows.
- Do the  results obtained  by Edwards  and van Wijnbergen  also  apply to the
timabt  e apeencing of  liberalization? In  principie  yes, because the  welfare loss
in their model  is supposed to turn up whenever wrong  relative  prices drive
resource allocation;  this  would  establish an  overall  presumption for  liberalizing
goedef  f-"t  arnd  capital later. YeL the  recent reform attempts  in Socialist
Countries suggest some caution with respect to such  unfettered generalizations.
Liberalization of goods markets implies that firms are allowed to set prices so
as  to accommodate wage pressures, while,in the absence of formal credit markets,
positive adjusttent costs. The same applies  when the model allows for on-the-job
training:  leaving  the  protected  sector,  after  gaining  some  sector-specific
experience in the first period, is costly.
26an active interfirm credit market develops. In turn, either the Central Bank
accommodates inflation demand  by creating  money  or refrains from  playing the role
of the lender cf  lact  reccrt  and does not accommodate price  increases,  causing
a  credit  crunch  which  propagates  more  rapidly  the  more  widespread  is  the
mechanism of interfirm credit before the stabilization 3 6.
Therefore, liberalizing the domestic goods market in a financially  repressed
economy results in  either inflationary  pressures or indiscriminate  bankruptcies.
In the  latter case,  firms are unable to  face the  switch to  hard  budgeting
promoted  by  the  Central  Bank.  In  such  a  case  stabilization  reforms  are
incompatible with goods market liberalization in  the absence of an intermediate
domestic financial liberalization.
- - It must  be pointed  out  that grouping public  and private  capital  flows
together, as it is often done when arguing against an early opening of capital
markets, can  be somewhat misleading.  Unlike  export credits  and  private investment
and lending,  which are usually heavily  correlated to  business expectations about
the evolution of the economy, foreign aid and concessional lending are meant to
obey different goals, one of which is  to reduce the  mentioned transitional costs
ru-  adjusL.tienL  a&id external shocks. Therefore, auuh  flows  are unlikely to  play the
same destabilizing role as private capital 37. Making this distinction  between
official and private capital flows, however, does not weaken the argument for
postponing the opening of the (private) capital account to the latest possible
stage.
3'  See Calvo and Coricelli (1990).
31 However,  excessive amounts  of  unconditioned foreign  official inflows  cause
shortcomings, too:  they  give  rise to  currency overvaluation  and  often  lend
support to the pursuit of wrong domestic policies. This was probably the case
with the generous international assistance provided to Somalia and Ethiopia in
the second half of the Eighties.
273.  HOW  EXPZCTATIONS AFFECT  COSTS  AND BENBFXTS OF  POLICY  REFORMS
Section  3.1  describes  how costm  anil  1-efite  of  rcf=--m.z  a_c  affccted  by  people's
expectations about  the  the  new  regime,  while  section  3.2  summarizes  the  main
causes,  consequences  and  remedies  to  Government  lack  of credibility,  drawing  on
the current  literature  on the  topic.
3.1  The  role  of  expectations  during the transition
Expectational  problems  are  usually  considered  transitional while "transition"
is defined  as the  period  in between  the long-run  and  the short-run 39; yet  what
is  meant  by "transition"  is not  always  clear.
An operational  definition  has been given above and is as follows: in the
presumption  that the overall  benefits  of policy  reforms  are greater  than the
costs  of change,  then  the  transition  to  adjustment  can  be seen  as the  period  for
which  the  current  costs  of the  reform  are  greater  than its  current  benefits  per
unit  of time.
Flawed  expectations  regarding  future  costs  or benefits  result  in too little  or
too much adjustment  (or  adjustment  in  the  wrong direction)  with respect  to the
cpt-..al  d_g.c_  -'  .B_curc allocatlor,  oun  U.lm V&  oi  the  private  sector  wnicn  tne
reform  is intended  to produce.
In fact,  a change  of regime  involves  more than a mere switch  from an initial
"bad"  state  to a final  "good"  state:  noninsurable  uncertainty  on its  costs  and
M  Since  expectations  are  deemed  to be fulfilled  in the long-run.
3  See,  for  instance,  Edwards  (1988,  p.175).
28benefits  and  on  what  category,  group  or  class  has  to  bear  the  burden  of
adjustment drives people to form either excessively optimistic or pessimistic
expectations. On the contrary, engendering the appropriate response from agents
may be crucial to the success  of reforms, at least in  market-oriented economies,
where resource allocation is to a large extent decentralized. Governments may
wonder  whether  there  is some room for  increasing the net benefits  from the
reforms by reducing misperceptions.
On the one hand, the absence of any commitment on the part of the policy-makers
would imply to leave the private sector observing costs higher than benefits
during  the transition, which  would  weaken the  consensus for  the manoeuvre. On  the
other hand,  unreasonable promises may well  succeed in deceiving the private
sector today and capturing an easy consensus, but at the price of paying the
price of reduced Government credibility in the future. This leads to consider
private sector's errors of  perception, which may be either Government-induced or
"autonomous".
Mussa (1986)  gives examples regarding trade liberalization. In  order to evaluate
benefits from moving out of the protected sector into the exportable  sector,
firms have to evaluate the Vy ue of installed capital in the two industries: if
expectations on the future path of earnings are wrong, so will values assigned
to the single units of capital.
When entrepreneurs  have static expectations  (so that they expect the present
differential in  sectoral rate  of returns  to stay constant  over time), the  private
evaluation of benefits from the reform will overstate the "true" social value.
If,  on the contrary, they correctly expect that, as accumulation takes place in
the new sector, the wedge between the rates  of return will narrow down, but they
are too pessimistic  in evaluating the pace at which this will occur, private
29expectations  of benefits  will undershoot  their social value. In both cases,
people  will improperly  adjust,  respectively,  too  much or too little.
Among  the  Government-induced  sources  of externalities,  the  presence  of taxes  on
factor  incomes,  reducing  the  privately  perceived  benefits  of  the  adjustment  with
respect  to  the  social  one,  causes  a  slowdown  in  the  adjustment  process,  at  least
when  individuals  only  take  into  account  the after-tax  present  discounted  value
of  their  "investment"'.
As to  private  market  failures  in  capital  markets,  individual  discount  rates  may
differ  from  the  social  one  (in  both  directions);  moreover,  the  country  as  a  whole
may face a rising  supply  curve  of credit,  due to country-risk  premium,  while
individuals  do believe  they face  a horizontal  curve 4". In such a case,  a tax  on
foreign  borrowing  would  enhance  welfare,  avoiding  the  over-adjustment  consequent
to euphoric  expectations.
As an  illustration,  consider  the  consequences  of external  shocks  using  the  same
graph  as in section  2. Permanent  shocks  (in  the form  of discrete  shifts  upwards
and downwards in the benefit curve)  result in symmetrically  shortening  or
prolonging  the transition  period,  depending  on whether they are positive  or
negative.  Positive (negative)  temporary  shocks  misperceived  as permanent  may
induce  people  to overadjust  (underadjust)  and  expect  an earlier  (later)  end  of
the  transition  with respect  to the  actual  date (see  figure  2).  For instance,  a
positive  external  terms  of trade  shock  feeds  into  higher  productivity  and  real
wages  in  the  exportable  sector,  yet,  when  the  day  of  reckoning  comes,  individuals
observe  net  actual  benefits  lower  than  expected,  which  may  result  in a complete
^  It is  here implicitly  assumed  that  Government  expenditure  does  not  affect
the  private  agents,  utility  function,  which  may not  be the  case.
41  This  seems  to  have  been  the  case  in  Chile  after  the  opening  of  the  capital
account.
30reversal  of  their  attitude  towards the  reform 42. This  is to  emphasize  that
people's  present  suspicious  attitude  finds  its  roots  in  past  unjustified
euphoria.  ±ne rise ana  rail or many popu  L1sr  poiicLes  in i..aiLn  America  are
examples of the permanent costs that excessive optimism at the outset, fed by
unlikely promises on future policy results, leaves to be paid in terms of the
ineffectiveness of future economic policies.
Among the  possible  causes of misperceptions, much  work  has been  devoted to
analyze causes, consequences and remedies to "lack of credibility", the label
attached to  the expectational difficulties  encountered by economic policies when
forward  looking and optimizing  private sector  and  Government  confront  in a
distorted environment. Some of the related issues are dealt with in section 3.2.
By now, figure 3 shows how lack  of credibility implies, as a result of "rational
pessimism", that the curve of the expected  benefits (EB)  lies beneath the actual
benefit curve, so that agents are led  to expect a longer and tougher transition
than the actual. This would complicate the consensus problem for the Government
from the beginning.
42  This  is  not  the  only  conceivable  case.  If  significant  pecuniary
externalities  exist  which,  in  a  "big  push"  fashion,  raise  investment
profitability  as  more  people  invest, then  it  could  be  worthwhile  for the
Government to be committed to optimistic promises, which, if believed, would
become self-fulfilling. However, relying  on self-fulfilling expectations for  the
effectiveness  of  reforms  might  be dangerous  especially  if  expectations  are
unstable.
313.2  Lack of  credibility: causes, consequences, remedies
Since  credibility  has proved  a catch-all word  in the  literature,  a precise
specification of causes, effects and remedies to lack of credibility seems to  be
in order.
As  argued  above,  not  all  policy  failures derive  from  lack  of  credibility;
moreover, even in the case in which credibility issues matter, they may not be
as relevant as other more tangible factors.
A number  of determinants of lack  of  credibility can be listed.  All of them appear
to  ultimately  descend  from  three sources:  objective  inconsistency,  time  or
dynamic inconsistency, and uncertainty.
First, if reforms are blatantly inconsistent  with other policies, the violation
of budget constraints  may be recognized by a rational, forward-looking and fully
informed private  sector, which  would tend  not to  believe  in policy-makers'
announcements.
Second, in  the  dynamic programming  terminology, a  policy course of action is  said
to  be  time  inconsistent  when  it  does  not  respect  Bellman's  principle  of
optimality, i.e. it forms  part of an optimal plan formulated at an initial date,
while being no longer optimal at a later date when it has to be implemented.
Because  of  distortions  (e.g.  irreversible  factors,  staggered  contracts,
unavallability of lump-sum taxation; also, conflicting goals between Government
and private  sector4), ex-ante and ex-post optimal policies  available to  the
Government may be different, thus tempting it to renege on its commitments.
4  Chari,  Kehoe, and  Prescott (1989)  show  that no time inconsistency problems
arise in  team environments, where agents form  a  grcup sharing a common objective,
so that each private agent's preferences coincides with the ones of the society
as a whole.
32However, the private sector, when considering whether the policy package it is
faced with is credible, correctly perceives Government incentives, drawing the
conclusion that policy-makers will not stick to their declared policy. In such
a case, the  public neither distrusts nor shows any other prior negative attitude
towards Government behaviour, but only provides a rational evaluation of the
policy-makers' promise.
Another important source of lack  of credibility is  uncertainty, either exogenous
or endogenous to the characteristics of Government and private  sector. In an
uncertain environment, a well-intentioned Government may be  simply unable to
respect its commitments if unforeseen contingencies occur. As Schelling  (1982)
points out, exogenous uncertainty springs up because the most a Government can
commit  itself to is an input (the  programme) rather than an output (the result
of the programme). The suggested advice in order to lessen "bad luck" costs is
for the Government to distribute the information it is provided with, so as to
enable individuals to link "input" (say,  the growth  rate of the money supply) and
"output" (say,  the inflation rate) in the same fashion as the Government does,
without incurring in misunderstandings.
Coming to  "endogenous"  uncertainty  (regarding agents' characteristics),  the
private sector  may be unsure about  the real intentions  of  the Government, because
it does not know whether the Government is "strong" or "weak" in its attitude
towards the declared goals. Depending on whether this suspicious  attitude  is
justified or not, the strong  Government, determined to carry out the reform, has
to undertake different actions.  If  being strong (S)  or  weak (W)  implies different
goals of economic policy, S  will find signalling its true attitude convenient in
33order  to  make  W's  mimicking  costliert  hence  an  incentive  to  overadjusting
arises44.  If,  vice  versa,  being  S  and  W refers  to  policy-makers,  ability  to
respect  their  promises`  under  coincident  goals,  it  would  be  irrational  for  S  not
to  compromise46.
The  most  direct  implication  of  lack  of  credibility  is that  reforms  are  expected
to  be  short-lived.  As a  result,  either  resources  are  not  reallocated  at  all  and
the  private  sector  adopts  a  "wait-and-see"  behaviour,  generating  a coordination
problem 47 ,  or  people  react  to  the  intertemporal  distortion  induced  in  relative
prices  by  the  transient  reform.  Ir.  some  of  his  papers,  Calvo  (1987,  1988a)4
investigates  how  lack  of  credibility  results  in  people  overconsuming  imports  or
overstoring  durable  goods  during  the  free  trade  regime,  perceived  as  temporary.
People's  anticipations  cause  unambiguous  welfare  losses:  the  shorter  the  period
of  free  trade,  the  sharper  the  intertemporal  distortion  and,  consequently,  the
welfare  loss.
In  addition  to  this,  were  policy  uncertainty  about  the  survival  of  the  reform
associated  with  investment  irreversibility  (e.g.  in  the  presence  of  positive
entry  and  exit  costs),  the  rise  in  investment  necessary  for  the  reform  to  be
'4 As  long  as  the  conditions  for  a  separating  equilibrium  to  show  up  hold.
See  Vickers  (1986),  Rodrik  (1989a)  and  Persson  & van  Wijnbergen  (1989).
4s Barro  (1986).
46 Cukierman  and  Liviatan  (1991)  propose  a  solution,  which  is still  time
inconsistent  in  a  world  without  precommitment:  a  half-way  announcement  does  not
eliminate  the  incentive  for  the  Government  to  deceive  the  private  sector  as  long
as  it  has  the  last  "move".
47 Dornbusch  (1988),  Simonsen  (1988),  Rodrik  (1989d),  provide  rationales  for
these  coordination  failures.
4  The  papers  contain  further  generalizations  of  the  main  argument  reported
in  the  text,  when  allowing  for  nontradable  goods,  money  and  ruling  out
intertemporal  substit-ution  in  consumption.
34sustainable' may not take place. In turn, an insufficient level of investment
ends  up  increasing  the  probability  of  reversals:  hence  policy  uncertainty
generates  the  posaibility of self-fulfilling  expectations  and  multiple equilibria
and  the economy may be stuck in the "wrong" equilibrium, though nothing is wrong
with the fundamentals.
Remedies differ depending on the source of lack of credibility;  in any case,
establishing (or restoring) credibility is indeed costly.
As  figure  4 shows, the  curve of expected benefit  shifts  up  as  a result of
successful building  up  of  reputation  from time  t' onwards,  but  the  higher
resource costs incurred to provide the signal would result in a similar upward
shift of the cost curve. The net outcome in terms of the end of the transition
period would thus be indeterminate: B', could in fact lie on the right as well
as on the left of B.
If public's distrust derives from objective inconsistency, the remedy consists
of  taking budget constraints into account-.
if time inconsistency is the cause of lack of credibility of economic policies,
institutional reforms directed at  making precommitments enforceable  ("tying  the
Government hands in advance") are usually advocated. Yet, this solution still
leaves the question of credibility of institutional reforms by themselves open
to discussion. We are thus  left with two more  opportunities:  eliminating  or
49  Rodrik  (1989d) discusses the role of private sector's expectations  in
determining  the reversal of  policy reforms.  Among the  numerous arguments advanced
to  explain  the consensus enjoyed  by protection (Governments  unwilling to renounce
to easy revenue collection, uneven distribution of gains from trade, short-term
electoral  concern),  Fernandez  and Rodrik  (1990) emphasize  the  role  of  the
uncertainty surrounding individuals' status after the reform, which determines
a bias in favour of the status quo. In this way, ex-post advisable reforms are
not agreed on ex-ante, nor carried out.
s  Once again simple in theory, though often overlooked in practice.
35lessening the distortions which cause time ilconsistency to arise or, given the
existing distortions, establishing reputation (at  least, as long as  the time  span
of the reform is not too short and the "game" is played without much  change in
environmental conditions).
When uncertainty  is at the origin of imp,rfect credibility. anntiincements  and
aignalling may be carried out to bridge the "credibility gap".
However, expectations are very unlikely to be influenced by mere announcements
or isolated attempts to reverse an  ongoing tendency (at  least, as long as people
are  not only  forward-looking, but  also able to  see through  Government  real
incentives).
Too simple announcements would produce inconsistent predictions, while detailed
or contingent announcements would require all the alternatives be specified in
advance,  which  has  two  shortcomings.  First,  an  announcement  respecting
requirements in terms of objective consistency  (coherence of means  and ends),
timing and speed, if strictly applied, would severely restrict the  freedom of
choice of the Government  in cases in which it enjoys informational  advantages
not  easy to spread around; second, contingent announcements  would complicate the
interpretation of the reform to the public.
In fact, the question that arises  is whether Governments should rather build up
favourable expectations along the way, without bothering very much  about the
state of expectations at the outset.
In  addition to  being tied  up in  its announcements, the  Government is also subject
to  constraints  on  the  way  in which  it  signals  its true  attitude  as  well,
especially when signals are formulated in the form  of over-adjustment  (which  is
usually the case advocated by the related literature).
36Signals,  likewise announcements, are costly", because they use up  resources,
which could be destined elsewhere. If a Government wants to  demonstrate  its
serious  intention to  Libera.Lze  by  suiDeLctzing  imports  (rather than  simply
reducing or eliminating tariffs), this will probably bring about more  severe
strain on the balance of payments  side as well  as on the Government  budget
constraint. Other items will have to give way  so as to maintain external and
domestic balance; otherwise, reduced expectational mistakes may be fully offset
by increased transitional costs of other nature.
5 In principle, this is taken into account in  the literature (for  example,
Rodrik  (1989a)), yet, when policy implications are drawn, this requirement is
often left implicit.
374.  CONCLUSIONS ON EXPECTATIONAL ISSUES AND REFORM DYNAMICS
Hisperceptions  of  reform  costs and  benefits  add  another  uistortion  (of an
intertemporal nature) to the many already identified and investigated  in the
literature, which prevent the economy from reaching a first best solution.
Some results from the literature on credibility, partially summarized in section
3.2, point to the necessity of addressing credibility problems directly through
preannounced  institutional  changes  acting  as  signals  that  a  new  policy
orientation is being followed.
In fact,  bold moves in  trade reforms such  as  Turkey's elimination of quantitative
restrictions to imports,  Venezuela's abolition of  the agency in  charge of foreign
exchange allocation, Chile's elimination of quotas associated with  a drastic
reduction in the highest tariff rates are reported as examples of credibility-
enhancing measures in World Bank (1990,  p.50).
However, even taking for granted that the mentioned cases are success stories,
some doubts can be cast on such seemingly  widely held view. This is not to deny
the relevance of the concept of credibility in the analysis of policy reforms,
but  rather  to  emphasize  that  credibility considerations  do  not  necessarily
justify reforming Governments  to take on too risky attitudes  towards  reform
implementation,  especially  in  the  presence  of  only  partial  and  not  yet
consolidated policy prescriptions.
On  the stabilization side, the quoted  example of heterodox shock  policies reminds
that "signals" not respecting the budget constraint or too long restraining the
functioning of a  market economy, such  as price freezes, rapidly  undermine, rather
than  reinforce,  the  credibility  of  a  reform, witnessing  the  difficulty  of
directly  targeting  credibility  by  itself.  They  may  succeed  in  making
38stabilization not as painful as traditionally believed, but end up postsponing
the solution of problems to the future in the conventional  populist fashion,
while narrowing  the path  of future liberalization  reforms.  Honeymoon periods only
bring about temporary benefits, unless they are backed  by adjustment  in the
"fundamentals".
At  the  same  time,  countries  like  Bolivia  and  Mexico,  which  obtained  a
surprisingly rapid disinflatiQr.  in the recent past, while failing an equally
rapid return to sustained growth, can be taken to indicate that adjusting the
"fundamentals" may not be enough. If investors retain their option to "wait and
see" (Dornbusch, Rodrik), a coordination problem arises and the desired supply
response lags  behind. In such a case,  expectations might be in  theory positively
influenced by appropriate Government intervention or, better, conditional loans
at concessional terms from international organizations, which would help lessen
uncertainty about the future.
As  to  liberalization  and  welfare-improving  resource  reallocations,  the
theoretical  case for caution seems to be overall  strengthened.  Froot  (1988)
points out that, whenever a country has limited access to foreign credit, and is
thus  forced  to  deplete  its  foreign  currency  reserves  to  finance  external
deficits,  deviations  from the  first-best policy,  such  as  a  slower  pace  of
liberalization,  would  lessen  the  distortion caused  by  lack of  credibility.
Moreover, the Edwards-van  Wijnbergen proposition on liberalizing trade first and
capital later is also strengthened by the arguments brought forward by Calvo
(1988b): given that imperfect credibility results in amplifying the existing
distortions, simultaneously opening  up markets  with different speeds of reaction
(such as goods and capital) would trigger off a more rapid deterioration in the
external accounts.
39rn general, it  remains unclear whether a strong precommitment to a specific path
of reforms is ever  effective on credibility grounds in  those cases when currently
undertaken  reforms come after a number of past policy failures. As  Calvo and
Rodrik have shown, when reforms are perceived as temporary, their anticipation
may  be  very  costly.  This  points  to  the  inappropriateness  of  long-standing
precommitments, while suggesting that discredited Governments would better not
make any announcements, nor  send "signals"  at all.  A much  more advisable strategy
would thue consist of starting from  the easiest and safest  reforms and narrowing
the "field"  of the game at the beginning, while delaying more ambitious moves to
a  later stage.
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